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I. INTRODUCTION
 “Crowdfunding,” which is defined as “the practice of . . . solicit-
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ing [financial] contributions from a large number of people especially 
from the online community,”1 has recently taken the financial world 
by storm through the advent of websites like “Kickstarter,” “Funda-
ble,” “IndieGogo,” “Razoo,” and “Appbackr.”2  Such websites provide 
a marketplace whereby companies, small businesses, and entrepre-
neurs looking for startup capital can solicit funding from individual 
investors.3  The concept is relatively straightforward: project creators 
initiate a profile that includes informative bits like short videos, a brief 
synopsis of the project, and images to further showcase the project.4
Each project has a target amount of funding to be raised, and is active 
for a fixed time period, which is commonly displayed as a countdown 
with an ongoing tally of funds raised.5  Ultimately, the goal of crowd-
funding is to create a highly specific and unique group of like-minded 
individuals from the general public, and in turn utilize that communi-
ty to generate necessary capital to implement a project or even create a 
business.6
The rise of crowdfunding in recent years7 has drawn attention from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).8  On April 5, 2012, 
President Barack Obama signed the JOBS Act into law, hailing it as a 
“potential game changer” for small businesses and startups.9  The 
JOBS Act added section 4(a)(6) to the Securities Act of 1933, and in do-
ing so provided securities regulation exemptions for crowdfunding 
sites meeting a number of basic criteria.10  Since its passing, the JOBS 
Act has come under significant scrutiny for failing to provide adequate 
1. Crowdfunding, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/GTB4-K75C] (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017). 
2. DEBORAH GONZALEZ, MANAGING ONLINE RISK: APPS, MOBILE, AND SOCIAL MEDIA
SECURITY 200 (2015). 
3. See Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit The Economy, FORBES
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-
crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/. 
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II. 
8. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
9. Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESS SECRETARY (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing [https://perma.cc/6SP4-
LNLX].
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012 & Supp. 2015); GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 201. 
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clarification on important considerations,11 providing overly burden-
some requirements and limits on crowdfunding sites,12 and a number 
of other issues.13  Scrutiny of the JOBS Act has become so pronounced 
that some Republican lawmakers have led a movement for sweeping 
changes to the Act, known as the “JOBS Act 2.0.”14  As a result of the 
issues with the JOBS Act, coupled with a need to provide regulations 
on intrastate transactions that do not fall within the jurisdiction of fed-
eral securities regulation, individual states have begun implementing 
their own securities regulation exemptions for crowdfunding sites.15
Wisconsin became one of the first states to institute its own intra-
state crowdfunding exemption statute,16 which passed into law as part 
of 2013 Wisconsin Act 52 and became effective on June 1, 2014.17  The 
Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption statute shares many common el-
ements with the federal crowdfunding exemption,18 and runs some-
what parallel with similar exemption statutes in other states.19  How-
11. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 202. 
12. See Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Frustration Rises Over Crowdfunding Rules, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 30, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579532251627028512
[https://perma.cc/TFW4-VYQL]. 
13. See, e.g., Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2014); Tom Wentzell, Comment, The JOBS Act: Effects on Capital 
Market Competition in Both Public and Private Markets, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 892, 892 (2013); 
James J. Williamson, Comment, The JOBS Act and Middle-Income Investors: Why It Doesn’t Go 
Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2069 (2013). 
14. Joseph Lawler, House Republicans Aim for JOBS Act 2.0, WASH. EXAM’R, Apr. 9, 2014,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/house-republicans-aim-for-jobs-act-
2.0/article/2547013 [https://perma.cc/4CMX-RC24]. 
15. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 202. 
16. See Crowdfunding in Wisconsin, WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS,
http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/A35E-U6TB] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
17. Id.  For further discussion on Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption statute, see in-
fra Part IV. 
18. Compare WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016), and WIS. STAT. § 551.205 (2015–
2016), with 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012). 
19. Wisconsin imposes similar caps on amounts received to Idaho, Indiana, and Mich-
igan. Compare WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27), and WIS. STAT. § 551.205, with IND. CODE § 23-
19-2-2(27) (2015), and IDAHO CODE § 30-14-203 (2004), and In Re Treasure Valley Angel Fund, 
LLC (fka Meridian Angel Fund, LLC) Request for an Order Pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-14-
203, BLUE SKY L. REP. 21729, 2014 WL 4063439 (2015), and MICH. COMP. LAWS.
§ 451.2202a(c)(i), (ii) (2013).  Each state requires some level of registration with state regula-
tory bodies and notice and disclosure requirements, though the levels to which each are re-
quired differ. See Edward A. Fallone, Crowdfunding and Sport: How Soon Until the Fans Own 
the Franchise?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7, 28–29 (2014). 
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ever, like corresponding exemptions provided by federal law and 
many state “blue sky” laws,20 Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption 
falls short in key areas, including the definitions of certain classes of 
investors, investment receipt caps placed on individual crowdfunding 
projects, and contribution limitations placed on classes of individual 
investors.  Such issues severely hamper the efficacy of the Wisconsin’s 
crowdfunding exemption provisions and potentially denigrate any 
long-term viability of crowdfunding as a primary method of capital 
generation for small businesses and startups. 
This Article will explore these practical concerns and place them in 
the context of other intrastate crowdfunding exemptions.  Part II will 
provide a brief history of crowdfunding and highlight its rise to prom-
inence in recent years.  Part III will further explain crowdfunding as a 
capital-generation medium.  Part IV will briefly examine the general 
regulatory environment for crowdfunding, including an overview of 
both federal and state law.  Part V will explore key issues with Wis-
consin’s crowdfunding exemption laws and propose a modified 
framework of Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption with an eye to-
wards the future of crowdfunding as a means of generating capital. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CROWDFUNDING
The concept of crowdfunding is hardly a novel one.  In 1713, Alex-
ander Pope set out on a substantial project: translate the entirety of 
Homer’s Iliad from Greek to English.21  The project involved six vol-
umes, more than 15,000 lines, and took five years to complete, but 
Pope was ultimately able to accomplish his goal.22  How?  Pope crowd-
funded the project.23  To secure necessary funding, Pope offered name 
acknowledgement in the published work in exchange for a pledge of 
two gold guineas, resulting in 750 subscribers and enough money to 
print his translation.24
Other major historical figures have similarly relied on crowdfund-
ing.25  World-renowned composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart once 
20. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV.
347, 348 (1991). 
21. Justin Kazmark, Kickstarter Before Kickstarter, THE KICKSTARTER BLOG (July 18, 
2013), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-before-kickstarter
[https://perma.cc/3BW6-M6CK]. 
22. Id.; see generally HOMER, THE ILIAD (Alexander Pope trans., 1715). 
23. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 199. 
24. Id.
25. Id. at 199–200. 
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relied on crowdfunding in hopes of generating enough capital to per-
form publicly.26  In 1783, Mozart offered copies of the manuscript for 
three piano concertos he composed so that he could raise the necessary 
financial support to play them in Vienna.27  He did not succeed initial-
ly, but he tried again in 1784, received 176 pledges, and ultimately 
raised the funding to play the concertos.28  One-hundred-and-one 
years later, The New York World publisher Joseph Pulitzer raised over 
$100,000 in donations from readers to provide a pedestal to display the 
Statue of Liberty after the American Committee for the Statue of Liber-
ty ran out of funding.29  In exchange for one dollar of financial support, 
Pulitzer promised each donor a reward in the form of a six-inch statu-
ette of Lady Liberty.30
The modern movement in funding known as “crowdfunding” 
dates back as early as 1997, when British rock band Marillion raised 
$60,000 to fund its reunion tour by soliciting online fan donations.31
Four years later, “ArtistShare” became the first official hub for online 
crowdfunding.32  The website still exists to this day and seeks to “con-
nect artists with fans in order to share the . . . creative process and 
[fund] the creation of new artistic works.”33  There was little further 
movement on the crowdfunding front until 2008, when IndieGogo 
launched, followed by KickStarter in 2009.34  More crowdfunding sites 
have jumped on the bandwagon in recent years, offering different 
types of services towards different target markets.35  Since 2009, the 
crowdfunding industry as a whole has grown by one thousand percent 
and is now a multi-billion dollar industry with future growth likely on 
26. Id. at 199. 
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 200. 
30. Kazmark, supra note 21. 
31. See id.; Mark Feinberg, Why Donation-based Crowdfunding is Here to Stay (and Grow-
ing), THE CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1050-why-donation-based-crowdfunding-is-here-to-
stay-and-growing [https://perma.cc/9ZFY-9LB2]. 
32. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 200; Feinberg, supra note 31. 
33. What is ArtistShare?, ARTISTSHARE, http://www.artistshare.com/v4/ 
[https://perma.cc/7V8U-CHAS] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
34. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 200. 
35. See Sandeep Sood: The Rise of Crowdfunding, WALL ST. J.: THE ACCELERATORS, Sept. 
30, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/09/30/sandeep-sood-the-rise-of-
crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/4SBR-6LZE]. 
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1068 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:1063 
the horizon.36  The takeaway is this: crowdfunding is not a new or 
novel concept, but its recent explosion cannot be ignored, nor passed 
off as a mere fad that will be completely extinguished in the near fu-
ture. 
III. CROWDFUNDING EXPLAINED
As discussed previously, crowdfunding in its most basic conceptu-
al form is the soliciting of funding from individual donors, generally 
utilizing the Internet as the means of transaction.37  However, the me-
chanics of crowdfunding are more nuanced, as crowdfunding exists in 
multiple forms that function in different ways, in turn creating differ-
ent relationships between businesses and financial contributors.38  In 
all, there are three distinct types of crowdfunding: (1) donation crowd-
funding; (2) reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding; and (3) debt or 
equity crowdfunding.39
A. Donation Crowdfunding 
Donation crowdfunding sites, as the name suggests, offer nothing 
to the donor in return for financial contributions besides a warm, fuzzy 
feeling or, in some cases, a tax write-off.40  One such example is “Go-
FundMe,” a crowdfunding site that allows individuals to seek funding 
for various causes under a plethora of categories, including “Medical,” 
“Volunteer,” “Emergencies,” “Education,” and “Memorials.”41  While 
donation crowdfunding sites are the simplest in nature, they are not 
particularly useful for entrepreneurial efforts.42  Not many purely do-
nation-based crowdfunding sites exist, and though donations may 
fund for-profit projects, most donation crowdfunders focus on funding 
requests from non-profit organizations, social causes, and political 
36. Id.
37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
38. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 14–27 (2012). 
39. Id. at 14–15.  Bradford splits “reward” and “pre-purchase” crowdfunding into two 
separate categories initially, but then combines them into one. Id. at 16. 
40. Id. at 15; Sally Outlaw, Which Type of Crowdfunding is Best for You?, ENTREPRENEUR
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228524 [https://perma.cc/D34Q-
7D4R].
41. GOFUNDME, http://www.gofundme.com/ [https://perma.cc/A5XX-9WKQ] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
42. See Outlaw, supra note 40. 
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campaigns.43
B. Reward and Pre-Purchase Crowdfunding 
Reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding are very similar in nature, 
and usually appear concurrently on crowdfunding sites.44  Under the 
reward model (which was classically exhibited by Pulitzer),45 a busi-
ness or startup soliciting funds offers contributors something in return 
for a financial contribution.46  Similarly, the pre-purchase approach al-
lows financial contributors to purchase the product in advance of the 
general public, sometimes at a discounted rate.47  Usually, the reward 
model will consist of at least three levels of contributions, with higher 
financial input resulting in greater rewards.48  Kickstarter and Indie-
Gogo are two prime examples of rewards-based crowdfunding sites.49
C. Securities-Based Crowdfunding: Debt and Equity 
The third major form of crowdfunding differs distinctly from dona-
tion or reward/pre-purchase crowdfunding, and creates the need for 
both federal and state governments to step in and impose securities 
regulations.50  In essence, equity and debt-based crowdfunding act as if 
a company were offering stocks or bonds to potential investors on an 
open market in connection with an ongoing business enterprise.51  In 
general, such offerings are squarely within the definition of a “securi-
ty” under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which includes 
in its definition of security any “note” or “stock.”52  As a result, federal 
43. Bradford, supra note 38, at 15. 
44. Id. at 16. 
45. See discussion supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
46. Bradford, supra note 38, at 16. 
47. Id. 
48. Types of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE,
http://www.fundable.com/crowdfunding101/types-of-crowdfunding
[https://perma.cc/49PF-NBBN] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
49. See generally KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/L7LU-DQKN] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/ [https://perma.cc/FS8U-33MA] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
50. Fallone, supra note 19, at 18. 
51. See Bradford, supra note 38, at 24. 
52. Fallone, supra note 19, at 18; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).  Two different cas-
es lay out the Supreme Court’s tests for what qualifies as a “stock” and what qualifies as a 
“note” within the meaning of section 2(a)(1).  In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 
(1985), the Supreme Court defined what a “common stock” is, relying on the prominent 
characteristics security instruments commonly classified as “common stocks” all possess.  
The Court focused on five main traits: (1) the right of shareholders to receive dividends; (2) 
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securities regulation is required for interstate transactions, and state 
securities regulation is required for intrastate transactions.53  Though 
security-based crowdfunding offerings seem inexorably similar to 
general offers and sales of securities via traditional mediums, they dif-
fer significantly enough to be addressed distinctly due to three main 
characteristics: (1) crowdfunding offers and sales generally rely on the 
use of Internet portals to promote the offers and effectuate the transac-
tions; (2) crowdfunding offers are generally made by small, relatively 
unsophisticated issuers in small monetary volumes; and (3) the level of 
connection that an investor may have to the issuer, based on familial 
relationships, friendships, or other interpersonal means, may be in-
creased when compared with securities transactions performed on a 
larger scale and in a more open and public context.54
1. Debt-Based Crowdfunding 
In lending, or debt crowdfunding, individual crowdfunders lend 
money to businesses and startups via an Internet portal set up for 
crowdfunding activity.55  The business or startup then repays the 
amount over time, either with interest or merely a return of the princi-
pal.56  Lending crowdfunding usually targets a different kind of con-
sumer than donation or reward crowdfunding platforms.57  Crowd-
funding Internet portals that are looking for businesses to use their 
service to engage in debt-based offerings often target “restaurants, re-
tailers, salons, gyms . . . that already have customers, already have 
negotiability; (3) the ability to pledge the instrument as collateral; (4) the conferring of vot-
ing rights to shareholders; and (5) appreciability. Id. at 686.  The Supreme Court adopted a 
different definition for “notes” in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), known as the 
“family resemblance” test.  Under the family resemblance test, any debt instrument that has 
a maturity date of greater than nine months is presumed to be a security within the mean-
ing of section 2(a)(1). Id. at 63–67.  However, the presumption is rebuttable, and only holds 
up if the instrument bears a family resemblance to instruments that are commonly consid-
ered notes based on a four-factor test.  If the motives of purchaser, the plan of distribution, 
and the public’s reasonable expectations are in line with those commonly associated with a 
note, and no alternative regulatory schemes exist, then the short-term debt instrument will 
almost certainly be considered a note. Id. at 66–67. 
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012).  Though the Securities Act of 1933 instituted sweeping 
securities regulation reforms, it also preserved the jurisdiction of state-level securities regu-
lation bodies, meaning state “blue sky” laws remained in effect in certain situations where 
federal law did not apply.  See id.; Macey & Miller, supra note 20, at 348. 
54. See Fallone, supra note 19, at 17–18. 
55. Outlaw, supra note 40. 
56. Bradford, supra note 38, at 20. 
57. Outlaw, supra note 40. 
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cash flow, and can service debt.”58  Such crowdfunding platforms may 
also target companies that are “at least a year old and [have] at least a 
year’s worth of receipts.”59  Thus, in lending or debt crowdfunding, 
which can also be properly described as “peer-to-peer lending,”60 both 
a different type of business and consumer may be the focal point of 
lending-based crowdfunding platforms. 
2. Equity-Based Crowdfunding 
Equity crowdfunding acts just as any sale of stock, and allows 
businesses and startups to sell ownership stakes via crowdfunding 
sites, in turn allowing financial contributors to become investors, thus 
gaining shareholder status and potentially generating a return on in-
vestment.61  While debt-based crowdfunding may or may not involve 
any actual profit, depending on whether or not the debt instrument 
provides for any return of interest or merely principal,62 equity crowd-
funding is based on an expectation of return on investment.63  As a re-
sult, of the four types of crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding is the 
most obvious model that necessarily involves securities.64  Crowd-
funding sites active in the United States that offer equity-based models 
include AngelList and Fundable.65  The development of equity crowd-
funding in particular has led to the need for securities regulations and 
brought about the crowdfunding-specific sections of the JOBS Act, 
along with further state regulations.66  Both debt and equity crowd-
funding offerings and sales ultimately exhibit classic properties of 
transactions that are considered squarely within the realm of activity 
that must be regulated under federal and state law, even if they have 
unique characteristics relative to more traditional concepts of stock 
and debt offerings.67
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bradford, supra note 38, at 20. 
61. Outlaw, supra note 40. 
62. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
63. Outlaw, supra note 40. 
64. Bradford, supra note 39, at 24 (“The equity model is the model that most clearly in-
volves the sale of a security.”).
65. See generally ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/ [https://perma.cc/G7VS-W8WU] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017); Types of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, http://www.fundable.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RTD-286N] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
66. See Outlaw, supra note 40. 
67. See supra Part II. 
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IV. CURRENT CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTIONS
To fully understand the benefit offered by Wisconsin’s intrastate 
crowdfunding regulation exemption laws, it is first important to un-
derstand the overarching framework of securities regulation, including 
the interplay between federal and state requirements, and the benefits 
that exemption from registration provide.  Securities regulation in its 
skeletal function works as follows: any entity making an offering that 
meets the definition of a “security” must ordinarily register that securi-
ty with SEC.68  However, there are exceptions from federal registra-
tion.  For example, if the security in question is only offered, sold, and 
transferred to investors within a single state, then that offering may be 
considered “intrastate” and be eligible for federal exemption under 
section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933.69  However, exemption 
from federal registration does not preclude all potential registration 
requirements.70  Where an issuer is exempt from registration with the 
SEC under federal law, it still must find a state exemption to be ex-
empt from registration with the state regulatory bodies where securi-
ties are offered or sold.71  Thus, where a Wisconsin issuer is able to rely 
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (providing a number of interests and instruments 
that qualify as securities under federal law); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012). 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012 & Supp. 2015) (“Any security which is part of an issue 
offered and sold to only persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer 
of such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorpo-
rated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.”).  It should be noted that a sec-
tion 3(a)(11) exemption can be destroyed even after the issuer’s offering and sale is com-
plete.  Bryn Vaaler, Financing a Small Business In Mississippi: A Practitioner’s Guide to Federal 
and State Securities Exemptions Part II, 63 MISS. L.J. 267, 306–22 (1994).  For example, where a 
purchaser of an intrastate issuer’s security resells the security to an out-of-state purchaser, 
and the security has not “come to rest,” that resale may be integrated with the original issu-
ing, meaning that the section 3(a)(11) exemption would be destroyed.  Id. at 321–22; 17 
C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (2013) (providing that the section 3(a)(11) exemption does not apply 
where any resale of a security as part of a 3(a)(11) offering is made to an out-of-state resi-
dent within a nine month period from the date of the last sale of securities as part of the of-
fering); Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 656–57 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a resale of 
securities to an out-of-state resident within seven months after the last security as part of an 
intrastate issuing may not destroy the section 3(a)(11) exemption where the initial sales 
were “bona fide”). 
70. See Small Business and the SEC, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm [https://perma.cc/97QT-S775] (last vis-
ited Jan. 7, 2016) (“If your company is selling securities, it must comply with both federal 
regulations and state securities laws and regulations in the states where securities are of-
fered and sold . . . A particular offering exempt under the federal securities laws is not nec-
essarily exempt from any state laws.”). 
71. For an extended discussion of the interplay between federal and state crowdfund-
ing exemptions, see Fallone, supra note 19, at 22–31. 
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on the intrastate exemption to avoid federal registration, it still must 
find an exemption under Wisconsin state law to be fully exempt from 
all securities registration requirements under both federal and state 
law.72
The primary advantage of exemption from registration can be sub-
stantial, especially for small business owners who lack the funds and 
resources of a large corporation.73 Absent an exemption, issuers must 
create and submit extensive disclosures containing highly-detailed in-
formation about the issuer’s financials, operations, products, and busi-
ness activities.74  The disclosures must be both accurate and complete, 
and producing the necessary registration and disclosure materials re-
quires a significant amount of due diligence efforts by specialized law-
yers and investment bankers.75  The fees associated with employing a 
law firm and an investment banking firm will undoubtedly be high, 
and would naturally serve to prevent many potential small issuers 
from making any sort of offering due to a lack of resources.76  Addi-
tionally, registration and other filing fees can be a major problem for 
potential crowdfunding issuers.77  Without an exemption, issuers must 
file both with the SEC and state regulatory bodies in each state where 
securities are offered or sold.78  Since crowdfunding issuers primarily 
use Internet portals to offer and sell the securities, the offering will 
very likely be construed as an offer or sale to each and every state, thus 
requiring registration in all fifty states.79  As a result, many businesses 
who would consider using crowdfunding as a means to generate capi-
tal not only would prefer an exemption, but absolutely must have one 
to be able to raise funds via crowdfunding. 
A. Federal v. State Crowdfunding Exemptions in General 
Before tackling Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption specifically, 
a brief look at federal and state crowdfunding regulations is useful to 
provide context on the overarching body of crowdfunding regulations 
72. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(b) (2015–2016) (expressly requiring an issuer to be 
exempt under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 in order to qualify for the Wis-
consin crowdfunding exemption). 
73. Fallone, supra note 19, at 19. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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in the United States broadly.  Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 
1933 provides the federal exemption from registration with the SEC in 
qualifying crowdfunding offerings.80  In addition to the federal exemp-
tion, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have passed 
crowdfunding exemptions relating to specifically intrastate transac-
tions.81  Seven more states have crowdfunding exemption legislation 
pending, and four states have rejected proposed crowdfunding ex-
emptions.82
Though the specifics vary to some degree, the essence of the 
crowdfunding exemptions across state and federal law are very simi-
lar.  Most states follow Congress’s lead, and have instituted a flat, 
$1,000,000 cap on amounts received via crowdfunding in any twelve-
month period.83  Others, including Wisconsin, allow for up to 
$2,000,000 under certain conditions.84  In addition, federal law and 
many state laws limit the amounts that an individual investor may 
contribute to a crowdfunding offering in any twelve-month period.85
Further, similar to federal law, each state requires issuers to register 
with the state regulatory authority before making any offers or sales to 
the public and make certain disclosures available to potential inves-
tors.86  Some states go so far as to require the dissemination of quarter-
ly reports to investors regarding the company and its financial per-
formance.87  However, many other states’ crowdfunding exemptions 
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012 & Supp. 2015). 
81. Anthony J. Zeoli, State of the States – List of Current Active and Proposed Intrastate 
Crowdfunding Exemptions, CROWDFUNDING LEGAL HUB COM,
http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2015/01/16/state-of-the-states-list-of-current-active-
and-proposed-intrastate-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/T6XU-G2WK] (last updated Oct. 
2016).
82. Id.
83. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29. Compare WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016), and
WIS. STAT. § 551.205 (2015–2016), with IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 30-
14-203 (2014), and In Re Treasure Valley Angel Fund, LLC (fka Meridian Angel Fund, LLC) 
Request for an Order Pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-14-203, BLUE SKY L. REP. 21729 (C.C.H.),
2014 WL 4063439 (2015), and MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 451.2202a(c)(i), (ii) (2016). 
84. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016); IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2016). 
85. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016); IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2 (2016); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 451.2202 (2016). 
86. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29. 
87. Indiana, Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin are among the states that require 
the dissemination of quarterly reports for issuers utilizing a crowdfunding exemption.  Fal-
lone, supra note 19, at 29; IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(P) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 451.2022(b)(iv); WASH REV. CODE. § 21.20.880(3) (2014); WIS. STAT. § 551.205(2) (2015–
2016).
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are silent regarding any ongoing disclosure requirements.88  While the 
most basic tenants of the crowdfunding exemptions instituted across 
state laws and federal law are very similar, Wisconsin’s crowdfunding 
exemption is somewhat unique in its overall requirements.89  Never-
theless, the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption is burdened by many 
of the same deficiencies present in the broad body of crowdfunding 
regulation in the broad body of United States law at both the federal 
and state levels. 
B. Wisconsin’s Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption 
Wisconsin’s intrastate crowdfunding exemption lessens the burden 
on businesses seeking to offer a securities-based crowdfunding model 
to consumers, but nevertheless imposes limitations on amounts re-
ceived and filing requirements to provide sufficient notice to investors 
and the state in the hopes of protecting potentially unsophisticated in-
vestors from making poor investment decisions or from being victims 
of fraudulent sales of securities.90  Under Wisconsin law, “[a]n offer or 
sale of a security by an issuer” is exempted from regulation under the 
Wisconsin Uniform Securities Act if: (1) “[t]he issuer of the security is a 
business entity organized under [Wisconsin law] and authorized to do 
business in [Wisconsin]”;91 (2) the transaction is an intrastate offering 
within the federal exemption for intrastate offerings;92 and (3) the of-
fering of securities “is made exclusively through one or more Internet 
sites and each Internet site is registered with the division under 
§ 551.205(1)(b).”93
88. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29. 
89. See supra notes 83 and 84. 
90. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 279, 280 (2000) (noting the general goal of protecting investors in creating regulatory 
schemes governing the securities markets). 
91. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(a). 
92. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 
(2013).
93. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(e).  In addition to Wisconsin, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Texas all maintain an Internet-only re-
quirement in their respective crowdfunding exemptions.  Id.; IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) 
(2014); IOWA CODE § 502.202(24)(a)(1), (e) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.411(1)(r) (Lex-
isNexis 2015); MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.461(1)(b),  (3)(3) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-14-2.04(C) 
(2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111(24)(a)(xii) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. 49:3-50(b)(14)(v) (2015); 7 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25(d) (2015).  The District of Columbia has additional provisions in 
its crowdfunding exemption dealing with Internet broker-dealers, but does not place a flat 
requirement that all issuers using its crowdfunding exemption must offer and sell through 
an Internet portal. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 26-B, §§ 250.1, 250.2, 256.1 (2014).  Likewise, Illi-
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 207 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 207 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
8 HOVESTOL-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 2:05 PM
1076 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:1063 
In addition to those basic requirements, the Wisconsin crowdfund-
ing exemption scheme has two key components: (1) a hard cap on 
amounts received in a twelve-month period and limits on amounts 
that particular investors can contribute in a twelve-month period;94
and (2) notice filed with the Wisconsin Department of Financial Insti-
tutions (“WDFI”).95
1. Cap on Amounts Received 
Like under federal law96 and other states’ regulations,97 Wisconsin 
limits the amount of contribution an exclusively intrastate crowdfund-
ing platform can receive in a twelve-month period.98  Under Wisconsin 
law, a business may only receive up to either $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 
via crowdfunding offerings and sales in a twelve-month period.99
Whether the cap is $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 depends on whether the is-
suer has undergone a financial audit of its most recently completed fis-
cal year and made the audit available to each prospective investor and 
the administrator of the division of securities in the WDFI.100  If the is-
suer has undergone a financial audit of its most recently completed fis-
cal year and provided proper disclosure to prospective investors and 
the WDFI, the stepped-up $2,000,000 cap will be imposed.101  If the is-
suer has failed to fulfill either of the two requirements, the baseline 
$1,000,000 cap will be imposed.102
Two important caveats apply to the cap regardless of whether it is 
nois, Massachusetts, and Oregon contemplate that Internet portals may be used to facilitate 
crowdfunding offerings, but stop short of imposing the same requirement that Indiana and 
Wisconsin do.  See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4(T) (2016); 950 MASS. CODE REGS.
14.402(B)(13)(o) (2014); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0080(7), 441-035-0090(3)(b) (2015). 
94. See WIS. STAT. §§ 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b). 
95. See id. §§ 551.202(26)(f)–(n). 
96. The SEC’s crowdfunding regulation was adopted on October 30, 2015.  SEC Adopts 
Rules to Permit Crowdfunding: Proposes Amendments to Existing Rules to Facilitate Intrastate and 
Regional Securities Offerings.  SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 30, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/G6FU-M9AP] 
[hereinafter Proposed SEC Amendments to Existing Crowdfunding Rules].  Further changes 
have been proposed to raise the overall cap on amounts received from $1,000,000 to 
$5,000,000. Id.
97. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
98. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016). 
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also WIS. STAT. § 551.102(1m) (2015–2016) (“‘Administrator’ means the ad-
ministrator of the division of securities in the department of financial institutions.”). 
101. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(b) (2015–2016). 
102. Id. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a). 
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$1,000,000 or $2,000,000 for any issuer.  First, the current cap is subject 
to adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 551.206.103  As a result, the WDFI will 
adjust the monetary amounts specified in both caps “to reflect changes 
since January 1, 2014, in the consumer price index for all urban con-
sumers, Milwaukee-Racine area average, as determined by the U.S. 
department of labor,” round the caps to the nearest multiple of 
$50,000, and provide notice on the WDFI website.104  Thus, the caps 
could either increase or decrease depending on the consumer price in-
dex at five-year intervals. 
Second and more importantly, the cap could shrink for an issuer if 
the issuer has sold securities within twelve months before the first of-
fer or sale made in reliance on the crowdfunding exemption.105  In es-
sence, the provision is backward-looking and lowers the cap on an is-
suer by the sum of all securities sold in reliance on the crowdfunding 
exemption before the point at which the issuer made the current sale 
relying on the exemption.106  This limitation is potentially significant, 
as an issuer that wants to make a successive offering utilizing the 
crowdfunding exemption within a twelve-month period will have an 
even lower cap due to the integration imposed by Wis. Stat. 
§§ 551.202(c)(1)(a) or (b).107  Thus, depending on which cap applies, if 
an issuer sold $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 worth securities as part of a 
crowdfunding offering in the twelve-month window before a subse-
quent offering purporting to fall within the crowdfunding exemption, 
it will be prohibited from utilizing the crowdfunding exemption until 
the twelve-month look-back period has passed. 
2. Limitations on Individual Investors 
In addition to limiting total amounts issuers can receive in a 
twelve-month period, Wisconsin imposes strict limitations on inves-
tors, subject to an important potential exemption.  There is no limit on 
the number of investors an issuer can take in, but there are limitations 
on individual investors.108  Ordinarily under Wisconsin law, any single 
103. Id. §§ 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (explaining that the amount of either cap is “subject 
to adjustment under § 551.206”). 
104. WIS. STAT. § 551.206 (2015–2016). 
105. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016). 
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See Crowdfunding in Wisconsin, Frequently Asked Questions, WIS. DEPT. OF FIN.
INSTS., http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/faqCrowdfunding.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VH5L-7AQH] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
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investor is not allowed to contribute more than $10,000 to any issuer.109
However, the $10,000 limit is removed if the investor is considered an 
“accredited investor” or a “certified investor.”110
In Wisconsin, a “certified investor” must be a resident of the state 
of Wisconsin, and at the time of an offer or sale of securities, must have 
either: (1) “an individual net worth, or joint net worth with the indi-
vidual’s spouse, of at least $750,000”; or (2) “an individual income in 
excess of $100,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income 
with the individual’s spouse in excess of $150,000 in each of those 
years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income 
level in the current year.”111  “Accredited investors” are defined in 
Wisconsin as they are in Rule 501(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.112
Under Rule 501(a), accredited investors include the following: banks; 
savings and loan institutions; brokers and dealers of securities; private 
business development companies; retirement or employee benefit 
plans with assets in excess of $5,000,000; trusts with assets in excess of 
$5,000,000; “[a]ny director, executive officer, or general partner of the 
issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive 
officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer”; and nat-
ural persons with an individual or joint net worth greater than 
$1,000,000.113  On top of having no per-investor limitation on contribu-
tions to any single offering, funds raised via certified and accredited 
investors and any contributions from such investors do not count 
against the overall cap on issuers’ receipts in a twelve-month period.114
In addition, funds received from “institutional investors” do not 
count against the aggregate cap.115  “Institutional investors” involve a 
wide array of finance and banking institutions, along with other finan-
109. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(d) (2015–2016). 
110. Id.
111. WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016). 
112. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(13)(am) (2015–2016). 
113. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013).  For a full list of what qualifies as an “accredited in-
vestor” under federal law, see Rule 501(a).  It should be noted that a person’s primary resi-
dence is generally not included in the net worth calculation, subject to the exception pro-
vided in 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(ii).  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i). 
114. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(a)–(b) (2015–2016). 
115. Id. § 551.202(26)(c). Interestingly, Wisconsin does not expressly provide that insti-
tutional investors are exempt from the $10,000 per-investor limit, as accredited and certified 
investors are.  Since all three are expressly accounted for in § 551.202(26)(c)(1), and yet insti-
tutional investors are not referred to directly below in § 551.262(26)(d), it is reasonable to 
presume that an institutional investor would have to qualify as an accredited investor to be 
exempt from the $10,000 per-investor limit. 
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cial and banking professionals and advisers.116  In essence, Wisconsin 
imposes a hard aggregate cap on amounts received from “ordinary” 
investors, but removes any limitations on amounts received from in-
vestors attaining a certain status.117  Thus, issuers relying on the Wis-
consin crowdfunding exemption have a potentially unlimited aggre-
gate cap, depending on whether or not accredited or certified investors 
decide to purchase securities through the offering.118
3. Notice Requirements under the Crowdfunding Exemption 
In addition to strict caps on amounts received through crowdfund-
ing involving the offer or sale of securities, Wisconsin provides addi-
tional requirements that must be fulfilled before any offer or sale oc-
curs if issuers want to claim the Wisconsin crowdfunding 
exemption.119  First, the issuer must provide evidence that it is orga-
nized under Wisconsin law and authorized to do business in Wiscon-
sin to the operator of the Internet portal the issuer will use to conduct 
the crowdfunding offer or sale.120  Second, the Internet site operator of 
the portal used to offer or sell the securities must file a registration 
statement with the WDFI that includes the following: that the operator 
is a business entity organized under Wisconsin law and authorized to 
do business in Wisconsin; that the site is being used to offer and sell 
securities under the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption; the identity 
of, location of, and contact information for the operator; and potential-
ly, that the operator is registered as a broker-dealer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 551.401.121
Generally, the Internet site operator will have to state that it is reg-
istered as a broker-dealer under Wis. Stat. § 551.401.122  However, there 
are two exceptions to this general rule.123  First, the exception under 
§ 551.205(1)(b)(2) provides an operator will not have to register where 
116. For a complete definition of what comprises an “institutional investor,” see WIS.
STAT. § 551.102(11) (2015–2016).  Wisconsin also exempts from the aggregate cap any sales 
to officers, directors, partners, trustees, or individuals “occupying similar status or perform-
ing similar functions with respect to the issuer or to a person owning [ten] percent or more 
of the outstanding shares of any class or classes of securities of the issuer.”  WIS. STAT.
§ 551.202(26)(c)(2) (2015–2016). 
117. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26) (2015–2016).
118. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (2015–2016). 
119. WIS. STAT. § 551.205 (2014–2015).
120. Id. § 551.205(1)(a). 
121. Id. § 551.205(1)(b)(1). 
122. Id.
123. Id. § 551.205(1)(b)(2), (4). 
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it meets all of a series of eight prerequisites: (1) it does not offer in-
vestment advice or recommendations; (2) it does not solicit any pur-
chases, sales, or offers to buy the securities available on its portal; (3) it 
does not compensate any employees, agents, or others for solicitation 
or based on sales of securities on its portal; (4) it is not compensated 
based on securities sold, and it does not hold, manage, or possess in-
vestor funds or securities; (5) its fee charged to issuers is fixed, variable 
based on how long the securities are offered, or some combination 
therein; (6) it does not engage in advertising that specifically identifies, 
promotes, or otherwise refers to any individual securities offered; (7) it 
does not engage in any other activity that the WDFI determines is pro-
hibited; and (8) neither it, nor any party with management authority, is 
subject to any action specified in Rule 506(d)(1) of the Securities Act of 
1933 that would disqualify an issuer from the broker-dealer exemp-
tion.124  Second, the exception under § 551.205(1)(b)(4) provides that 
where a Wisconsin Internet site operator is registered federally as a 
broker-dealer, it will not have to in Wisconsin as well.125
In addition to pre-offer or sale requirements, issuers and Internet 
site operators have duties that apply following the commencement of 
the offering.126  First, both the issuer and the Internet site operator 
must “maintain records of all offers and sales of securities effected” 
done through the Internet site and must provide “ready access” to the 
WDFI upon request.127  Second, issuers must provide free, quarterly 
reports to their investors until no securities issued under the crowd-
124. Id.  Rule 506(d)(1) actions involve the “‘Bad Actor’ disqualification,” which dis-
qualifies an issuer from making an offering under Rules 506(b) and (c) of Regulation D “if 
the issuer or any other person covered by Rule 506(d) has a relevant criminal conviction, 
regulatory or court order or other disqualifying event” that happened on or after September 
23, 2013—the effective date of the most recent amendments to Rule 506. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.506(d)(1), (2) (2013); Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offer-
ings and Related Disclosure Requirements: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/bad-actor-small-
entity-compliance-guide.htm [https://perma.cc/6LC6-VQQC].  Rule 506(d) extends to all 
“covered persons,” which includes the issuer and any predecessors and affiliates; the issu-
er’s executive officers, directors, general partners, and managing members; twenty-percent 
beneficial owners of the issuer by total voting power; promoters connected to the issuer; 
fund investment managers if the issuer is a pooled investment fund; and all persons com-
pensated for soliciting investors.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1); Disqualification of Felons and Other 
“Bad Actors”, supra.
125. WIS. STAT. § 551.205(1)(b)(4) (2015–2016). 
126. See generally id. § 551.205. 
127. Id. § 551.205(1)(c). 
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funding exemption are outstanding.128  The issuer may satisfy the 
quarterly reporting requirement by making the information available 
on an Internet site so long as “the information is made available within 
[forty-five] days after the end of each fiscal quarter and remains avail-
able until the succeeding quarterly report is issued.”129  In addition, the 
issuer must file each quarterly report with the WDFI and provide a 
written copy of any report made available online to any investor upon 
the WDFI’s request.130
Wisconsin also imposes content requirements on each quarterly re-
port.131  Each report must set forth the cash compensation each director 
and executive officer received since the previous quarterly report, 
along with any “bonuses, stock options, other rights to receive securi-
ties of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer, or other compensation 
received” on an annual basis.132  Further, the issuer’s management 
must provide analysis of the issuer’s business operations, along with 
its financial condition.133  As reflected by Wis. Stat. § 551.205, exemp-
tion from having to go through the full securities registration process 
does not preclude all disclosure requirements.134  Issuers that seek the 
crowdfunding exemption and the operators of the sites they use as 
portals to conduct the offerings and sales nevertheless have burdens to 
provide certain, albeit limited, levels of documentation, notice, and in-
formation to the WDFI, each other, and investors.135
V. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES WITH THE WISCONSIN CROWDFUNDING
EXEMPTION AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES
Despite the buzz that the crowdfunding movement has generated 
nationwide, it has not caught on in Wisconsin when it comes to specif-
ically intrastate offerings.136  As of April 2017, only five Internet crowd-
funding portals have registered with the WDFI, and none have since 
128. Id. § 551.205(2). 
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. § 551.205(2)(a)–(b). 
132. Id. § 551.205(2)(a). 
133. Id. § 551.205(2)(b). 
134.  Id. § 551.205(2). 
135.  Id.
136. See Anthony Zeoli, State of the States: An Update on Intrastate Crowdfunding,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/09/51187-
state-states-update-intrastate-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/B3SR-6T5U]. 
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February 5, 2015.137  Further, only ten issuers have filed for the Wis-
consin crowdfunding exemption under Wis. Stat. § 551.205(26).138
Such a lack of activity begs the question: why are more Internet portals 
and issuers not utilizing the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption?  
Perhaps a lack of general public awareness of both the exemption itself 
and the potential for capital generation via crowdfunding is the 
cause,139 or perhaps some other extrinsic factors are present that are 
hampering the development of crowdfunding on an intrastate level.140
Regardless of any extrinsic factors, latent deficiencies in the regula-
tory scheme itself at minimum serve to create barriers to entry into the 
market that may deter Wisconsin businesses from attempting to utilize 
the exemption and make a crowdfunding offering. In response, Wis-
consin should modify its crowdfunding exemption in a manner that 
would make crowdfunding a more attractive capital generation medi-
um while maintaining investor protections that are at the heart of se-
curities regulation.  First, it should rework its current two-tier system 
of investor classes into a three-tiered system with revised definitions 
applying to each class in a manner that more narrowly and accurately 
protects certain types of investors.141  Second, it should apply a differ-
ent cap to each respective tier in a manner that increases the overall 
amount of potential capital available to crowdfunding issuers while 
maintaining adequate protections for investors that lack sophistication 
and/or wealth.142  Third, it should maintain its current notice and dis-
closure requirements, as they become even more essential with the in-
creased stakes for investors brought about by the cap increases.143
A. Rethinking Wisconsin’s Investor Classes 
In attempting to distinguish between investors who require more 
137. Internet Site Operator Registration Statements, WIS. DEPT. OF FIN. INSTS.,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/Crowdfunding/ISO [https://perma.cc/BV3Q-G5EV] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
138. DFI Crowdfunding Exempt Offerings, WIS. DEPT. OF FIN. INSTS.,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/Crowdfunding/Exemption [https://perma.cc/L6AP-XBC4] 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
139. See Zeoli, supra note 136 (suggesting one of the causes of the general lack of intra-
state crowdfunding activity nationwide is the general public’s lack of awareness and un-
derstanding of crowdfunding, along with an overall skepticism of the medium). 
140. Id. (suggesting some intrastate funding legislation has not passed due to outside 
factors such as misunderstanding of the bill itself, or attempts to bundle the proposals). 
141. See infra Part V.A. 
142. See infra Part V.B. 
143. See infra Part V.C. 
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protection and those who do not, Wisconsin incorporates the federal 
definition of “accredited investor” under Rule 501(a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, and exempts any funds received from such investors from 
applying against the aggregate cap on amounts received in a twelve-
month period under the exemption.144  In addition, Wisconsin defines 
and incorporates “institutional investors” and “certified investors” in-
to the exemption against the cap along with accredited investors.145
Further, Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption applies no per-investor 
limit regarding accredited and certified investors.146
The fundamental problem with Wisconsin’s creation of a separate 
range of investors to whom no limits apply is similar to the issues pre-
sent in the comparable class of investors under federal law.147  Wiscon-
sin ties its elevated class of investors in large part to net worth or year-
ly income,148 which is problematic because individuals with a large net 
worth or high yearly income level may still be novice investors who 
lack the sophistication to make intelligent, fully informed investment 
decisions.149  In fact, it is entirely possible that an individual with a rel-
atively low net worth or income level who would not qualify as part of 
the elevated class may possess significantly more sophistication re-
garding investments than an individual who qualifies as an accredited 
or certified investor.150  In other words, just because a particular inves-
tor has the funds to qualify as an “accredited” or “certified” investor, it 
does not necessarily follow that they should escape per-investor limi-
tations under a regulatory scheme.151
Rather, Wisconsin should rework its definition of certain types of 
investors under its crowdfunding exemption, and create three tiers of 
investors.  Under a revised framework, Wisconsin would first create a 
new class of investors, known as “qualified investors.”  The definition 
of a qualified investor would include three classes of investors: (1) in-
stitutional investors,152 (2) “any director, executive officer, or general 
144. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c) (2015–2016); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
145. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c) (2015–2016); WIS. STAT.§ 551.102(4m), (11) (2015–2016). 
146. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(d) (2015–2016). 
147. See generally Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Ac-
credited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009). 
148. See WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016) (defining “certified investors”); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.501(a) (2013) (defining “accredited investors”). 
149. See Finger, supra note 148, at 733–34. 
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See WIS. STAT. § 551.102(11) (2015–2016) (providing Wisconsin’s definition of “in-
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partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any di-
rector, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that 
issuer,”153 and (3) certain individual investors who are natural persons 
who possess sufficient “knowledge and experience in financial and 
business matters [to evaluate] the merits and risks of the prospective 
investment.”154  Such a definition would incorporate the federal defini-
tion of a “sophisticated” investor,155 and will not be tied to net worth or 
yearly income levels, as it is presumable that neither institutional in-
vestors, nor individuals possessing the requisite sophistication to make 
sound, informed investment decisions will require the protections that 
common investors need.156
Naturally, creating a tier based upon facially qualitative and poten-
tially ambiguous criteria such as “sophistication” requires some level 
of assessment and verification to be practically feasible and capable of 
implementation.157  Wallis K. Finger’s “licensing scheme” provides an 
effective example of how to identify properly sophisticated versus un-
sophisticated investors.158  Under a scheme similar to Finger’s, Wiscon-
sin would make a test available to investors seeking “qualified” status.  
Such a test would assess the investor’s knowledge of basic business 
principles, private and public offerings, issuers and purchasers, practi-
cal considerations in making informed investment decisions, and ele-
stitutional investor”). 
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2013).  Incorporating this aspect of Rule 501(a) into 
the definition of “qualified investor” captures the other subset of natural persons that might 
be considered accredited investors. See id. § 230.501(a)(5) (providing for persons whose in-
dividual or joint net worth exceeds $1,000,000 to be considered accredited investors); id.
§ 230.501(a)(6) (counting any natural person with “an individual income in excess of 
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse in 
excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the 
same income level in the current year” as an accredited investor).  Including Rule 501(a)(5) 
and (6) into the definition of qualified investors is inadvisable, because the goal of the pro-
posed framework is to only remove all limitations on investments based upon sophistica-
tion, as opposed to mere net worth or income levels. 
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2013).  Rule 506 provides for no aggregate investment 
cap where the purchasers are sophisticated, though it does limit the number of sophisticat-
ed purchasers in any offering to 35. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i), (ii); see also Finger, supra note 148, 
at 759–61 (proposing a licensing system for federal securities law whereby investors would 
have to pass one of two tests to show a sufficient level of knowledge and sophistication to 
be considered “licensed”). 
155. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2013). 
156. See generally Finger, supra note 148. 
157. See id. at 759–60. 
158. Id. at 759–66. 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 212 Side A      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 212 Side A      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
8 HOVESTOL-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 2:05 PM
2017] TO FUND OR NOT TO FUND 1085 
mentary principles of securities regulations.159  To ensure that inves-
tors maintain the level of knowledge and sophistication necessary to 
be a qualified investor, either a new test should be periodically admin-
istered to each investor who holds qualified status (perhaps at five to 
ten year intervals), or maintaining qualified status should be condi-
tioned on taking periodic educational courses to ensure the requisite 
level of knowledge and sophistication is maintained.160
As Finger points out, one potential criticism for such a requirement 
is the administrative costs that would result, including expenses asso-
ciated with designing the exam, creating testing centers, buying testing 
computers, and hiring individuals to proctor the exams.161  Additional-
ly, there could be investor-side costs, including paying a testing fee, 
and paying to take preparatory classes.162  Moreover, an exam-based 
system would not be free from error, and may from time-to-time bar a 
truly sophisticated investor from attaining qualified status or allow an 
unsophisticated investor to attain qualified status.163  Though a testing 
system would doubtlessly be imperfect and would require time and 
effort to iron out the initial problems that inevitably rise with such ini-
tiatives, it is nevertheless a more effective system than currently in 
place, and will serve to help better identify investors that truly are ca-
pable of making the kinds of informed investment decisions such that 
no investor protections in terms of aggregate caps on amounts re-
ceived or per-investor caps on amounts invested need apply.164
Below the tier of qualified investors would sit the second tier, 
which would contain “certified investors” and incorporate the defini-
tion of certified investors currently in place under Wisconsin law.165
Certified investors would be natural persons who do not meet the def-
inition of qualified investors, are Wisconsin residents, and have: (1) an 
individual or joint net worth exceeding $750,000; (2) an individual 
yearly income exceeding $100,000 in the two most recent years; or (3) a 
joint yearly income with his or her spouse exceeding $150,000 in the 
159. See id. at 762. 
160. See id. at 763 (suggesting ongoing educational courses as a requirement to main-
taining what he calls “licensed” investor status). 
161. Id. at 765. 
162. Id.
163. Id. at 763–64. 
164. See id. at 765–66 (addressing potential issues that may arise under a testing system 
to evaluate investors’ knowledge and sophistication). 
165. See WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016). 
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two most recent years.166  Since Wisconsin’s definition of “certified in-
vestor” looks at both individual or joint net worth and individual or 
joint income levels going back two years,167 and has a lower threshold 
for both net worth and income when compared with the federal defini-
tion of “accredited investor,”168 each and every individual that quali-
fied as an accredited investor under Rule 501(a)(5) and (6) would qual-
ify as a certified investor under Wisconsin law.169  Thus, there is no 
need for a separate class of “individual accredited investors” under the 
proposed framework, and simply defining the entire second tier as 
“certified investors” will suffice.  In essence, the second tier can be 
thought of as “non-qualified investors, plus.”  Individuals that are cer-
tified investors will not have the knowledge and sophistication re-
quired to be considered a qualified investor, but nevertheless possess a 
high level of net worth or income that allows them to fiscally handle a 
greater level of investment risk than common investors. 
The third and final tier is already in place under the current regula-
tory framework, and works as a catchall that includes all persons who 
are not qualified investors or certified investors.170  As a result, any in-
dividual investors that do not meet the sophistication requirements to 
be considered qualified investors, do not have a joint or individual net 
worth of $750,000, do not have an individual yearly income in excess 
of $100,000 in the past two years, and do not have a joint yearly in-
come in excess of $150,000 in the past two years necessarily will fall 
within the bottom tier.171
Creating a three-tier system for classifying investors under Wiscon-
sin’s crowdfunding exemption provides the foundation for increases 
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2013), with WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–
2016).
169. See discussion supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.  Wisconsin’s monetary 
thresholds to be a “certified investor” are $250,000 lower than the federal definition of “ac-
credited investor” when it comes to individual or joint net worth, $100,000 lower in terms of 
individual yearly income for the previous two years, and $150,000 lower regarding joint 
yearly income for the previous two years.  Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2013), with
WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016).  As a result, every “certified investor” and “accredit-
ed investor” overlap, and the only part of the federal definition of accredited investor that 
needs to be included in the proposed definition of “qualified investor” is the provision 
found in Rule 501(a)(4). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2013). 
170. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)–(d) (2015–2016). 
171. This operates the same as the current crowdfunding exemption, except for the 
addition of a third class of investors. See id.
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in the aggregate cap on total amounts of capital raised in any given 
crowdfunding offering.  In essence, providing for a tiered classification 
of investors that is significantly more focused than the current system 
allows for a more accurate advancement of the primary policy function 
served by investor protection under securities laws.172  By narrowing 
the class of investors whose contributions are excluded from the ag-
gregate cap, Wisconsin will be able to eliminate limits on investors 
where they are truly warranted and apply limitations where they are 
legitimately required. 
B. Raising the Cap on Amounts Received Under the Three-Tier System 
Working in conjunction with a three-tiered classification of inves-
tors is a three-tiered cap system, premised first on raising the overall 
amount of capital that companies may raise through a crowdfunding 
offering in Wisconsin.  Though the hard cap of $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 
may seem like a relatively generous number that provides ample op-
portunity to raise a significant amount of money, the cap itself may not 
be high enough, which may serve to dissuade businesses from at-
tempting to use crowdfunding.173  Other exemptions, such as Rule 505 
of Regulation D under federal securities law, allow for up to $5,000,000 
to be raised in a twelve-month period without significant disclosure 
requirements.174  Even if an issuer is exempt under the Wisconsin 
crowdfunding exemption, it still must submit an initial disclosure to 
the Internet portal it uses, and more significantly, must issue quarterly 
reports to investors.175  The costs associated with such submissions will 
undoubtedly be above the level of “negligible,” and could make 
crowdfunding a less attractive option than a private offering once costs 
are factored in in juxtaposition with the cap on funds raised imposed 
by Wisconsin law.176
172. See Choi, supra note 90, at 280. 
173. Anthony Zeoli, The Illinois Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption: The Reasoning Behind 
the Bill, CROWDFUNDING LEGAL HUB (Nov. 8, 2014), 
http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2014/11/08/the-illinois-intrastate-crowdfunding-
exemption-the-reasoning-behind-the-bill/ [https://perma.cc/JQE7-CCPE]. 
174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (2015); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2013) (imposing lim-
ited disclosure requirements on issuers making offerings qualifying under Regulation D). 
175. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3; WIS. STAT. § 551.205(1), (2) (2015–2016). 
176. See Steven Skolnick & Alan Wovsaniker, The JOBS Act: Improving Access to Capital 
Markets for Smaller Businesses, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW: LEADING LAWYERS
ON UNDERSTANDING IMPORTANT LEGISLATION AND COMPLYING WITH SEC RULES AND 
REGULATIONS (INSIDE THE MINDS) 5 (2016 ed.) (noting the generally expensive nature of fil-
ing quarterly reports because of the due diligence efforts required to ensure the complete-
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As part of the proposed framework, the top tier, containing quali-
fied investors, would have no cap on aggregate amounts raised via a 
crowdfunding offering, no cap on amounts contributed by any one 
qualified investor, and no limitation on the number of qualified inves-
tors that would participate in any crowdfunding offering.  In essence, 
the first tier is “wide open,” as investors that are institutional or indi-
viduals possessing a high level of business, financial, and investment 
sophistication should be able to invest as much as they want in an of-
fering of securities without the need for regulatory protection.177
Though doing so creates a potentially unlimited cap on funds that may 
be raised through a crowdfunding offering, it is no different than Wis-
consin’s current regulatory scheme, besides applying a narrower defi-
nition of who qualifies as part of the unlimited class of investors.178
Such a scheme echoes Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities 
Act of 1933,179 but does so in a way that is a significant improvement 
over Wisconsin’s current crowdfunding exemption due to a narrower 
definition of who qualifies. 
Unlike the first tier of qualified investors, both the middle tier and 
bottom tier will impose an aggregate cap on amounts received and a 
per-investor cap on amounts contributed to any crowdfunding offer-
ing, with the goal of increasing the overall cap crowdfunding offerings 
while maintaining sufficient investor protections.  At the second tier 
applying to certified investors, Wisconsin should apply an $8,000,000 
or $10,000,000 aggregate cap on total capital raised via investments 
made by certified investors, depending on whether the issuer has un-
dergone and made available a financial audit to both investors and the 
WDFI.180  In addition, each certified investor will have a $50,000 cap on 
the amount of funding he or she may contribute to any single crowd-
funding offering in exchange for securities within a twelve-month pe-
ness and accuracy of each quarterly report). 
177. See Finger, supra note 148, at 733–34 (highlighting the incongruous result that oc-
curs when the federal definition of accredited investor includes wealthy individuals with 
no sophistication and excludes people with substantial sophistication who fail to meet the 
net worth or income tests). 
178. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (2015–2016). 
179. Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933 provides for an unlim-
ited cap on investments received as part of a Rule 506 offering, so long as two requirements 
are fulfilled: (1) there are no more than thirty-five unaccredited, but sophisticated investors 
in the offering; and (2) all other investors are accredited.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)–(c) (2013). 
180. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016) (imposing a split cap depend-
ing on whether or not the issuer has undergone a financial audit of its most recently com-
pleted fiscal year that meets general accounting standards). 
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riod.  The third tier, which serves as a catchall for all investors not part 
of the top or middle tiers, will see its ceiling raised to $4,000,000 or 
$5,000,000, again depending on whether the audit requirement is ful-
filled.  Additionally, investors falling within the lower tier will have 
their individual cap on amounts invested to any single crowdfunding 
offering within a twelve-month period increased from $10,000 to 
$20,000.181  Like with qualified investors, there will be no limit on the 
number of investors in the middle or bottom tiers that may participate 
in any crowdfunding offering.  Under such a regulatory scheme, the 
cap on amounts received would be theoretically unlimited as it cur-
rently is, but would raise the current cap on ordinary investors from 
$1,000,000 or $2,000,000182 to $4,000,000 or $5,000,000, with up to an 
additional $8,000,000 or $10,000,000 coming from certified investors.  
As a result, the aggregate cap on amounts received from investors not 
qualifying for exemption from the cap would increase from $1,000,000 
or $2,000,000 to as much as $12,000,000 or $15,000,000, depending on 
the makeup of the overall investor pool.183
Though the proposed regulatory framework is more complex in 
structure than Wisconsin’s current crowdfunding exemption, it should 
be adopted for two primary reasons: (1) because investor protections 
need to be more accurate in terms of who is protected and the level to 
which they are protected; and (2) because caps on both aggregate 
amounts of capital raised and amounts contributed by individual in-
vestors as part of a crowdfunding offering need to be increased to 
stimulate more widespread use of crowdfunding in Wisconsin on an 
intrastate basis. 
C. Maintaining Current Notice and Disclosure Requirements 
Though Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption requires a moderate 
overhaul of its structure, definitions, and limitations, its current notice 
and disclosure requirements should be maintained in the interest of 
investor protection.184  As noted previously,185 Wisconsin is one of only 
181. See id. § 551.202(26)(d). 
182. See id. § 551.202(26)(c). 
183. Assuming that only third tier investors are involved, the cap would only increase 
from $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 or $5,000,000.  However, if any second tier, certi-
fied investors are involved in the offering, their presence effectively increases the cap by 
$8,000,000 or $10,000,000, raising the overall cap to $12,000,000 or $15,000,000. 
184. For a full discussion of Wisconsin’s notice and disclosure requirements, see dis-
cussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
185. See discussion supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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a few states that requires quarterly financial reports in addition to in-
centivizing financial audits through a stepped-up cap186 and imposing 
specific disclosure requirements to both investors and the state regula-
tory body.187  Such requirements become even more essential with an 
increased aggregate cap and raised ceilings on individual investors, as 
more money is on the line and the stakes are significantly raised.188  At 
the same time, the increased ability to raise funds brought about by in-
creased financial caps provides the issuer with more capital to apply 
towards generating financial reports and making the requisite disclo-
sures to investors and the WDFI.  Doing so will allow for investors to 
make better initial decisions on whether to purchase a given security, 
and what to do after the initial offering and sale is completed, such as 
hold, sell, or purchase more in the secondary market.  Wisconsin im-
plements its notice and disclosure requirements as applied to crowd-
funding issuers properly, and should continue to do so under a modi-
fied framework. 
VI. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by its recent growth and development,189 crowdfund-
ing has potential to become a more widely-spread method of capital 
generation.  However, in order to become a viable means of raising 
funds on an intrastate basis in Wisconsin, adjustments need to be 
made to the legislature’s first attempt at instituting regulations on 
crowdfunding and providing an exemption for crowdfunding offer-
ings.  This article has examined the regulatory framework of the Wis-
consin crowdfunding regulation in juxtaposition with basic tenants of 
corresponding regulations federally and in other states, highlighted 
the primary weaknesses in the current statutory schema, and provided 
for potential changes that may encourage greater levels of intrastate 
crowdfunding activity within Wisconsin while maintaining necessary 
investor protections.  Similar adjustments could be made to both the 
federal crowdfunding exemption and such exemptions currently in 
place in other states, and could be initially enacted in the twenty-one 
states lacking a crowdfunding exemption. 
It is inevitable that as time passes, technology advances, society 
186. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016). 
187. Id. § 551.205. 
188. See Zeoli, supra note 173 (advocating for minimum disclosure and updating re-
quirements imposed on issuers in the context of intrastate crowdfunding legislation). 
189. See discussion supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
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evolves, and global business practices adapt and modernize to meet 
the current sociocultural, technological, and economic environment.  
Due to the derivative challenges and concerns that naturally flow from 
such advancements, statutes must be rewritten and amended, and en-
tirely new regulatory schema must be developed.  The development of 
crowdfunding has created such a challenge, and the body of law relat-
ing to crowdfunding—both within and without Wisconsin—will need 
to continue to evolve to support a properly flexible regulatory scheme 
while protecting the interests of individual investors.  Doing so could 
be a boon for small businesses and investors statewide, and may en-
hance the Wisconsin economy in a notoriously unstable economic era. 
ANDREW S. HOVESTOL
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